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It owned a figurative EU trade mark containing the word ' HEITECH ', registered in 2008 and used since 6 May 2009 at the latest. It was only in April 2009 that the plaintiff sent a warning letter to the defendant, requesting that it cease and desist from using 'HEITECH' as a trade mark and company name.
SMRI’s predecessor in interest did business with the relevant defendants from at least 1999-2009; resold products bearing “Sturgis Motor Classic” in its own retail store; and never complained about the use of “Sturgis” or “Sturgis Motor Classic” on rally products. apart from the mark as shown.” It requires inexcusable delay and prejudice.
In that case, Judge Easterbrook wrote, in finding that a “shrinkwrap” license was enforceable against the defendant: But are rights created by contract “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright”? 2009) (holding that a contract was not preempted by copyright). Health Grades, Inc.
The 2009 Facebook Terms included the following clause: “accessing or using our website. at 18 (quoting the 2009 version of the Terms at issue in Fteja v. precedent, could Meta just amend its terms, send another cease-and-desist, and revisit this, or does this case repudiate that whole line of precedent? Meta’s Opp.
The Board found that the registrant, despite claiming attempts to sell or license the mark, had discontinued use of the mark with an intent not to resume use. Here, Respondent Branded never intended to use the mark itself, but claimed that it always intended to license or sell it. Vans, Inc. See Cerveceria , 10 USPQ2d at 1069.
In 2009, Prof. Unending Compulsory Licensing (“CL”) Discussion: Reading SpicyIP old pages, I found this decade-old post called Compulsory Licensing is Not a Bad Word! discussing India’s first Compulsory License (“CL”). among others. Sai Vinod’s post can get you some intellectual relief. Perhaps not.
Capitol Records (the successor to EMI) sent its first cease-and-desist letter to Vimeo in 2008 and sued Vimeo for copyright infringement in 2009. We rarely see lengthy (this one clocks in at 46 pages), detailed, and philosophical Section 512(c) opinions any more, and we only get this one because of the case’s extreme age.
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